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Financial markets where agents exchange risky assets serve two main purposes. First, they
allocate risk among traders and improve allocative eﬃciency. Second, they diﬀuse traders’
private information and facilitate information diﬀusion. The simultaneous pursuit of alloca-
tive and informational eﬃciency is usually impossible. Diﬀerent market arrangements are
more favorable to the search for diﬀerent notions of eﬃciency. We observe that the state of
knowledge in this respect is remarkably unbalanced.
There is a vast literature on market microstructure that is especially keen on the analysis
of the conditions aﬀecting the revelation (and exploitation) of private information. On the
other hand, much less attention has been devoted to the functioning of ﬁnancial markets
with respect to allocative eﬃciency. This problem is the focus of our paper, which aims to
provide the experimental evidence needed to ground a theoretical analysis.
We study the performance of four market protocols with regard to allocative eﬃciency
and other performance criteria such as volume or volatility. These additional criteria are
usually extolled by exchange regulators because they can be objectively measured and
provide useful proxies for the evaluation of a market protocol. The four market protocols
that we examine are: the batch auction, the continuous double auction, a special form
of (nondiscretionary) specialist dealership, and a hybrid of these last two. Contrary to
theoretical constructs such as Walrasian tˆ atonnement, these four protocols are practically
implementable because the space of messages that traders need to post is simple.
We test the protocols by running (computerized) experiments in an environment that
controls for traders’ behavior and rules out any informational eﬀect. The behavior of the
agents span how they formulate trading strategies, how they form expectations, and how
they interpret signals. Working with agent-based simulations instead of human agents
permits to isolate the impact of the trading protocols from these behavioral components.
In standard laboratory experiments, instead, it is not possible to extricate the interactions
between protocol and behavioral eﬀects.
The main behavioral limitation on our agents is that they exhibit limited intelligence,
similarly to the “zero intelligence” traders in Gode and Sunder (1993). The price of the risky
asset is the main driver for their choices; but, like real traders in real markets, they ignore
the correct equilibrium price and thus lack an essential piece of information to compute
the eﬃcient allocation. This leaves the market protocol in charge of “discovering” the right
price for them. From a roaring and confused crowd of traders each trying to (guess and)
achieve his preferred risk allocation, the market protocol must extract and send out price
1signals that point traders in the right direction. This makes convergence to the “right” price
a necessary condition for allocative eﬃciency. Assuming that there is suﬃcient liquidity in
the market, we ﬁnd that all protocols generically converge to the eﬃcient allocation and to
the equilibrium price in ﬁnite time.
We then turn to a dynamic analysis of the performances. For practical purposes, it
is probably more important to know how protocols perform during the (perhaps long)
transient period before they achieve the eﬃcient allocation. We study how long it takes for
diﬀerent protocols to discover the equilibrium price and how fast they lead traders to the
eﬃcient risk sharing allocation. We measure the volume of trade developed to reach the
eﬃcient allocation from the initial endowment, as well as the volatility of the time series of
prices. This extended comparison over several dynamic performance criteria produces no
clear winner, but the presence of a nondiscretionary specialist dealer is clearly associated
with the best all-round performance. Continuing the analogy above, the introduction of an
nondiscretionary “center” in a market protocol seems to improve its ability to stabilize and
direct traders’ own groping for the right price.
The organization of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes the model tested
in our experiments. In particular, Section 2.5 provides a comparative review of our model
against the relevant literature. Section 3 details the experimental design and provides
detailed instructions for its replication. Section 4 reports on the results obtained and
Section 5 oﬀers our conclusions.
2 The model
Following Smith (1982), we identify three distinct components for our (simulated) exchange
markets. The environment in Section 2.1 describes the general characteristics of the econ-
omy, including agents’ preferences and endowments. The market protocols in Section 2.2
provide the institutional details which regulate the functioning of an exchange. The be-
havioral assumptions in Section 2.3 specify how agents make decisions and take actions.
Section 2.4 details a few alternative behavioral assumptions that have been used to test
the robustness of our conclusions. Finally, Section 2.5 compares how our assumptions fares
with those prevailing in the received literature.
2.1 The environment
We consider a two-asset economy with n traders. The two available assets are a risky stock
and cash. The rate of interest is normalized to zero, so cash acts as the numeraire. The
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far future. Each trader i has an initial endowment of cash ci ≥ 0 and shares si ≥ 0. The
total amount of cash and stock in the economy is C =
P
i ci > 0 and S =
P
i si > 0.
To rule out any informational eﬀect, we assume that all traders believe that Y is normally
distributed with mean µ ≥ 0 and precision τ = 1/σ2 > 0 and that no new information is
ever released. Therefore, traders’ beliefs about Y are homogeneous and never change until
uncertainty resolves.
Each trader i has “cara” preferences over his ﬁnal wealth, with a coeﬃcient of risk tol-
erance ki > 0. Therefore, trader i’s excess demand function for stock (net of his endowment
si) is the linear function
qi(p) = kiτ(µ − p) − si. (1)
Let K =
P
i ki be the sum of traders’ coeﬃcients of risk tolerance. By well-known results
pioneered in Wilson (1968), the unique eﬃcient risk-sharing allocation for this economy
requires that trader i holds s∗
i = (S/K)ki shares of the stock. In other words, the eﬃcient
allocation is unique and proportional to the coeﬃcient of risk tolerance.
2.2 The market protocols
Clearly, the competitive equilibrium achieves the eﬃcient allocation in this environment.
The zero aggregate excess demand condition implies











is exactly ﬁlled, making his ﬁnal allocation qi(p∗) + si equal to the required s∗
i = (S/K)ki.
Hence, if a market protocol attains the competitive equilibrium, it implements the eﬃcient
allocation.
The issue, however, is that the informational requirements for a competitive equilibrium
are often not realistic. For instance, the ﬁctitious protocol of the Walrasian auctioneer
requires an iterative process during which traders communicate their entire excess demand
function to a centralized market maker before any trade takes actually place. Realistic
market protocols are much simpler, in the sense that they require far less information from
traders.
3We compare the performances of four simple market protocols: a batch auction, a con-
tinuous double auction, an automated dealership, and a hybrid market. The ﬁrst protocol
is simultaneous, while the other three are sequential. Except where otherwise noted, the
following features are common to all the four protocols.
A protocol is organized in trading sessions (or days). Agents participate to every trading
session, but each of them can exchange at most one unit in each trading day. During a
trading session, an agent can buy or sell at most one unit of the risky asset. If the protocol
is sequential, the order in which agents place their orders is randomly chosen for each
trading session. If the protocol is simultaneous, all order are made known and processed
simultaneously so the time of their submission is irrelevant. In every trading session, each
agent selects randomly one side of the market where he attempts to place a trade: he can
switch roles across trading sessions, but he cannot place simultaneous orders for buying
and selling within the same session. The books are completely cleared at the end of each
trading session.
Prices are quoted using a minimum tick; in other words, they are discretized. Moreover,
prices must be nonnegative: if a trader places a bid lower than zero, this is ignored; if a
trader places an ask lower than zero, this is automatically converted to the lowest strictly
positive price compatible with the existing tick.
Batch auction. In each trading session, after traders submit their orders, the aggregate
excess demand function is computed and the exchange price p∗ is determined by setting
the aggregate excess demand equal to zero. If there are multiple solutions, we select the
midpoint of the interval between the lowest and the highest clearing price. (If there are
no solutions, no exchange takes place.) Shares and corresponding payments are exchanged
between traders who submitted bids not lower than p∗ and asks not higher than p∗. Traders
who placed orders exactly at price p∗ may be accordingly rationed. This protocol is also
known as the k-double auction, with k = 1/2.
Continuous double auction. In each trading session, traders place their orders on the
selling and buying books. Their orders are immediately executed if they are marketable;
otherwise, they are recorded on the books with the usual price-time priority. Orders are
canceled only when a matching order arrives or the trading day is over.
Automated dealership. There is a specialist dealer who posts bids and asks valid only
for a unit transaction. Agents check sequentially the dealer’s quotes for the side of the
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place at the quoted price. Right after a transaction is completed, the two dealer’s quotes
for bid and ask increase by one if the agent completed a purchase and decrease by one
otherwise. The size of the bid-ask spread stays ﬁxed over time, so the price is never unique.
Limited to this protocol, therefore, convergence of prices to a given value p∗ should be
interpreted as convergence to prices to a bid-ask interval that contains p∗.
Hybrid market. This protocol combines the continuous double auction with the auto-
mated dealership. Distinct selling and buying books hold quotes from the specialist dealer
and from the public, respectively. The dealer must post bids and asks valid only for a unit
transaction and revises her quotes as in the automated dealership; in particular, she moves
her quotes only after transactions in which she has been involved. Agents check sequentially
the books for the side of the transaction they are attempting. Their orders are immediately
executed at the best price available (which may be diﬀerent from the specialist’s) if they
are marketable; otherwise, they are recorded on the traders’ book with the usual price-time
priority. Agents’ orders are canceled only when a matching order arrives or the trading
day is over. Hence, once deposited on the traders’ book, an order from an agent cannot be
executed with the dealer.
We note two limitations to the realism of our assumptions about the market protocols.
First, in a sequential protocol, the order of arrival for agents is randomly chosen: this mutes
any issue concerning the trade-oﬀ between eﬃcacy and immediacy. Second, we assume
that agents can trade at most one unit per trading session: this circumvents the problem
of choosing the order size. Similar restrictive assumptions are common in the literature;
see for instance Glosten and Milgrom (1985), which has inspired our version of specialist
dealership.
2.3 Behavioral assumptions
A major obstacle in the study of microeconomic systems is that their performance is jointly
determined by the interactions of traders’ behavior within the market protocol. As traders
may react diﬀerently to diﬀerent market protocols, it is diﬃcult to separate the intrinsic
characteristics of a market protocol from the properties induced by the traders’ strate-
gies. We follow the usual approach and concentrate on the institutional characteristics of
the protocols, by making general-purpose assumptions on traders’ behavior that constrain
their freedom of choice. Except where otherwise noted, these assumptions hold for all the
5(computerized) experiments reported in this paper.
There are three established assumptions in the literature. One is that traders are re-
stricted to trade one unit at a time. This restriction on traded quantities simpliﬁes the
strategy space and allows direct comparisons with existing theoretical results. The second
assumption states that buying orders are constrained by the available cash and selling orders
by the available endowment of stock; that is, budget constraints hold. This is consistent
with a value-based strategy (“buy low, sell high”), which is a seemingly natural require-
ment of rationality for traders’ behaviors. The third assumption is that each trader has a
constant valuation for each unit traded. We maintain the ﬁrst two assumptions, but relax
the third one.
In our setting, the demand function (1) of each trader is strictly decreasing. The as-
sumption of constant unit valuations is naturally generalized by deducing the valuation for
the next unit to trade from the demand function. If the current endowment of a trader is
si, we invert his unit excess demand function ±1 = kiτ(µ−p)−si and derive his valuation
for the next unit to trade as




where the ± sign depends on whether the attempted trade is a purchase or a sale. Clearly,
this implies that the reservation price of each trader depends on the side of the transaction
he is entering and on his current endowment si; moreover, his (implicit) bid-ask spread is
2/(kiτ).
Given his valuation, a trader must decide which side of the transaction he wants to
attempt and (if necessary) what price to oﬀer. We assume that, at the start of a trading
session, each trader chooses either side with equal probability. This randomized choice is
stochastically independent of previous history, endowment, or any other parameter of the
model. After the choice of the trading side is made, therefore, a trader “knows” that he is
going to be a buyer (or a seller) and that his valuation for the next unit he will attempt to
buy (or sell) is p(+1) (or p(−1)) from Equation 3. Once his trading intentions are known,
a trader (deterministically) places a bid or an ask equal to his valuation. We nickname this
assumption by TT, as a mnemonic for “truth-telling” behavior.
The common properties of our market protocols may impose two deviations from truth-
telling. First, the valuation of a trader may be a number diﬀerent from the ticked prices. As
detailed below, we adopt an “exact” experimental design that rules out this case. Second,
the valuation of a trader may be negative; in this occurrence, all protocols refuse negative
bids and automatically update a negative ask to the lowest non-zero ticked price.
62.4 Alternative behavioral assumptions
The set of assumptions in Section 2.3 uniquely determines traders’ behavior in each of the
diﬀerent market protocols examined in this paper. In our simpliﬁed environment, therefore,
the only diﬀerences in performances are due only to the institutional diﬀerences embodied
in the market protocols. This insulation from spurious eﬀects (due to traders’ behavior)
makes it possible to evaluate market protocols on their own. Clearly, this insulation carries
a cost in realism because it is a sensible assumption that real traders adjust their strategies
to the type of market protocol they are forced to use. Rather, the agents in our simulations
exhibit zero intelligence under several respects. They do not react to diﬀerences in the
market protocol; they do not attempt to trade strategically; they do not update their
behavior rules over time.
Given that the purpose of the study is to understand the performance of market proto-
cols per se, we justify the assumption of zero intelligence because the experimental design
should try as much as possible to keep traders’ behavior unchanged across diﬀerent insti-
tutions. On the other hand, since there are several ways to achieve this objective, we have
tested the robustness of our conclusions under two diﬀerent sets of behavioral assumptions.
Compared to how TT solves the tradeoﬀ between eﬃcacy and immediacy, the ﬁrst behav-
ioral assumption sacriﬁces some immediacy for greater eﬃcacy while the second one goes in
the opposite direction. This allows us to rank the behavioral assumptions used in this paper
from least to most eﬃcacious or, equivalently, from most to least immediate. Hereafter is
the description of these two alternative sets of behavioral assumptions.
The ﬁrst set of assumptions is directly inspired by Gode and Sunder (1993). Under the
heading of “zero intelligence”, they assume that buyers bid a price uniformly drawn from
the interval [0,p(+1)] and sellers ask a price uniformly drawn from the interval [p(−1),2p∗],
where p∗ is the competitive equilibrium price. We nickname their implementation as GS.
Compared to TT, the GS assumption is a closer approximation to a common form of strate-
gic trading that misrepresent valuations in order to extract more surplus from a transaction.
This makes it harder to complete a transaction and thus reduces immediacy; on the other
hand, conditional on trading taking place, it increases the probability of a better price and
thus improves eﬃcacy. Clearly, the GS assumption also introduces an additional source of
noise in the model which may confound the results.
The second set of assumptions is inspired by a notion of mental accounting similar to the
arguments in Thaler and Johnson (1990). They report experiments showing that gambling
behavior is aﬀected by the sign of the current net monetary position with respect to the
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In our context, this suggests that the traders should increase their willingness to trade when
their past transactions have been more proﬁtable.
We implement this requirement modifying the valuation price in TT as follows. Consider
a trader i who has a valuation v for one unit and buys it at price of p, making a “gain”
of v − p; similarly, let p − v the gain of the trader when he completes a sale. At each
trading session t, given the (possibly empty) history of his past trades before t, a trader
has matured a trading surplus G equal to the (undiscounted) sum of his past gains. We
assume that, at time t, the valuation of a buyer is his price p(+1) from (3) increased by his
current trading surplus G. Similarly, the valuation of a seller is p(−1) − G. We nickname
this implementation MA as a mnemonic for mental accounting.
Compared to TT, the MA assumption makes traders who have had a lucky streak
of transaction prices in the past more willing to trade; on the other hand, it does not
aﬀect the behavior of the “unlucky” players who had transacted exactly at their valuation
price. Clearly, this makes it generically easier to complete a transaction and thus improves
immediacy; moreover, conditional on trading taking place, it increases the probability of a
worse price and thus reduces eﬃcacy. The MA assumption does not introduce additional
sources of noise in the model.
2.5 Comparison with the literature
The seminal contribution about computerized experiments in a controlled environment is
Gode and Sunder (1993). This paper establishes the allocative eﬃciency of the continuous
double auction under zero intelligence or, in our jargon, under the GS assumption. Our
analysis extends this work into two directions. First, we explicitly compare the allocative
eﬃciency of several diﬀerent market protocols and ﬁnd that they all share the ability to lead
zero intelligence traders towards the eﬃcient allocation. Second, we replace their assumption
of constant unit valuations for each trader with decreasing unit valuations. In particular,
this would dispose of the critique in Cliﬀ and Bruten (1997) about possible nonconvergence
to the equilibrium price.
Bottazzi, Dosi and Rebesco (2005) compare the allocative eﬃciency and other perfor-
mance criteria for three protocols (Walrasian tˆ atonnement, the batch auction, and the
continuous double auction) under behavioral assumptions very diﬀerent from ours. They
consider an ecology of trend followers and noise traders and they allow traders to place
variable-size orders which are generated using an ad hoc rule. Their study is unable to
separate behavioral from market eﬀects, leading to the somewhat weak conclusion reported
8in the abstract: “The results highlight the importance of the institutional setting in shaping
the dynamics of the market but also suggest that the latter can become the outcome of a
complicated interaction between the trading protocol and the ecology of traders’ behaviors.
In particular, we show that market architectures bear a central inﬂuence upon the time se-
ries properties of market dynamics. Conversely, the revealed allocative eﬃciency of diﬀerent
market settings is strongly inﬂuenced by the trading behavior of agents.”
Audet, Gravelle, and Young (2002) compare execution quality in a batch auction and
in a competitive (and discretionary) dealership market. The paper argues that execution
quality is a multiattribute concept, whose measurement involves some combination of diﬀer-
ent measures of performance. From a behavioral point of view, the paper assumes liquidity
traders subject to informational shocks and derives choices using a complex neural net-
work approximation to Nash behavior. The main conclusion is that (their own variant of)
the competitive dealership provides superior execution quality when trading is thin and
correlated or when there are large liquidity shocks.
Satterthwaite and Williams (2002) view a market protocol as an algorithm to solve the
problem of allocative eﬃciency. Agents have constant unit valuations and are restricted
to trade at most one unit per trading session. They assume that agents view trading as
a repeated one-shot game with incomplete information and play equilibrium strategies.
Consequently, MA behavior is ruled out. Under these assumptions, the paper proves that
the batch auction is worst-case asymptotically optimal: as the number of agents grows, it
forces the worst-case ineﬃciency to zero at the fastest possible rate. Transient eﬀects or
other measure of performance are not considered.
3 Experimental design
3.1 Identiﬁcation
A simulation run for our model requires the speciﬁcation of ﬁve global parameters, a list of
individual variables for each trader, as well as speciﬁc assumptions about market protocol
and traders’ behavior. The global parameters are the number n of traders, the mean µ and
the variance σ2 of the realization value Y of the stock, the number t of trading sessions,
and the size ∆ of the tick. Individually, a trader i is characterized by his coeﬃcient ki of
risk tolerance and by his endowment of cash ci and stock si. Finally, for protocols involving
the dealer, we need to select her initial quotes.
The market protocols are described in Section 2.2. For ease of reference, we nickname
these four protocols as B (batch auction), C (continuous double auction), D (automated
9dealership), and H (hybrid market). Similarly, our three sets of behavioral assumptions are
described in Section 2.3 and 2.4. They have been nicknamed TT (truth-telling), GS (Gode
and Sunder), and MA (mental accounting).
We have run (computerized) simulations for all 4 × 3 = 12 possible combinations of
protocols and behavioral assumptions, over diﬀerent instantiations of the parameters. The
results reported in Section 4 seem to be robust to substantial changes in the parameters.
The only exception that needs a separate study (left to future research) is the case where the
overall liquidity C =
P
i ci of the system is very low. Therefore, to simplify the presentation,
we ﬁx the exemplar parametric conﬁguration reported in Table 1 and report the simulations
for the four market protocols under diﬀerent behavioral assumptions. The initial dealer’s
quotes are a bid of 745 and an ask of 751, with a ﬁxed bid-ask spread of 6.
Parameters Initialization





Trader ki = divisors of σ2 in [10,40]
ci = 50,000
si = permutation of 2ki
Table 1: Exemplar for identiﬁcation.
While the choice of the parameters is largely irrelevant, there are some features that
deserve to be noted. Assume TT and recall that buying and selling valuations for one unit
obey (3). Since the tick is ∆ = 1, ticked prices must be integers. If the right-hand side
of (3) is always an integer, traders have integer valuations and the market protocol need
not round bids and asks to a ticked price. In this case, we say that the simulation exactly
implements TT because the messages passed by agents are never modiﬁed (even minimally)
by the market protocol. The most important consequence of an exact implementation is
that it allows exact convergence to the equilibrium price supporting the eﬃcient alloca-
tion. (Properly speaking, exact convergence is not relevant under the automated dealership
protocol, because the ﬁxed bid-ask spread prevents the price from being unique.)
We have taken care to ensure that our exemplar case exactly implements the three
market protocols under study. To this purpose, we choose integer values for µ and σ2 and
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a subset of the divisors of σ2. (The choice σ2 = 120 makes sure that there is adequate
variety among the divisors.) In our highly structured context, this is suﬃcient for exact
implementation under both TT and MA, as well as under GS if one assumes (as we do)
that the support of the uniform draws over bids and asks is formed by the integers in the
two characterizing intervals.
The appeal of exact implementation is mostly theoretical: we do not expect real market
protocols to be suﬃciently ﬁne to make exact implementation possible in practice. Moreover,
the impact of approximate implementation is likely to be minimal and, consequently, most
simulations in the literature do not bother at all with it. On the other hand, we believe
that computerized simulations should explicitly deal with this issue for two reasons. First,
the experimental testing of market protocols should approximate as closely as possible ideal
conditions: exact implementation is necessary for convergence to allocative eﬃciency, which
is probably the most important performance criterion. Second, as part of the experimental
study, one might also try and assess how the failure of exact implementation aﬀects the
performance of a protocol. For the purpose of this study, it suﬃces to note that all the
simulations reported satisfy the requirement of exact implementation.
A second and minor feature is that the parameters in the exemplar are chosen to simplify
the computation of the competitive equilibrium price given by (2). We initialize the vector





i ki = 2K and therefore, by (2), the competitive equilibrium price is p∗ = µ−2σ2 = 760
in all of our reported simulations.
Figure 1 provides a visual summary of a typical instantiation of the coeﬃcients of risk
tolerance ki’s and of the initial endowment si’s. The coeﬃcients of risk tolerance are al-
ways divisors of the variance, and the initial endowments are random (and stochastically
independent) permutations of these. Therefore, the marginal frequency distribution of the
coeﬃcients of risk tolerance is taken to be independent of the initial endowments.
Finally, we stress that the parameters in the exemplar are not an attempt to calibrate
the model to any speciﬁc set of real data. We do not claim that our model has the de-
scriptive power that would warrant a calibration exercise. Our simulations are blind to
any informational eﬀects and thus are not ﬁt to replicate the price dynamics observed in
real markets. The purpose of this study is limited to gather evidence on the performance
of diﬀerent market protocols with regard to allocative eﬃciency, and our results do not
extrapolate to markets subject to informational eﬀects.

































Figure 1: Initial endowments versus risk tolerances.
3.2 The simulations
A round of testing requires to simulate 4 × 3 = 12 possible combinations of protocols
and behavioral assumptions. In order to keep experimental conditions as comparable as
possible, a typical round of simulations runs as follows. For each batch of 12 combinations,
we instantiate parameters according to the same exemplar. We have tested a large range
of exemplars. For simplicity, all simulations reported in this paper share the initialization
reported in Table 1.
We also try to reduce to a minimum the impact of randomness on the simulations. Under
TT and MA, the only sources of randomness are in the order in which agents are sampled
under a sequential market protocol and in the choice of which side of the transaction they
attempt to complete. Under GS, a third source of randomness is in the selection of bids
and asks from two intervals of possible choices. For each batch of simulations, we use the
same (randomly chosen) sampling and the same (randomly chosen) selection of transacting
sides. In other words, the sequence in which players place orders and the side they attempt
to transact is the same within each batch of simulations.
At the end of a batch of simulations, we record the time series for prices, volume, and
endowments, and compute relevant statistics for the performance criteria discussed in the
next section. The simulations have been run using a dedicated package of routines written
12in Pascal.1
3.3 The performance criteria
There are several criteria that can be used to evaluate the performance of a market protocol.
One of our two focuses of interest is the ability of market protocols to attain the eﬃcient
allocation, so we report on their convergence to the eﬃcient allocation, as well as on the
speed with which they achieve it. We measure traded volume, because higher volumes signal
less eﬀective protocols that let unnecessary trades take place. The second focus of interest
is the dynamic behavior of a protocol (“how does it get there?”) and therefore we also keep
track of the evolution of these and other appropriate indicators over time. For instance, we
report standard deviations and kurtosis for the time series of the closing prices. These are
useful indicators for assessing the stability of prices over time, even though Stigler (1964)
has long ago warned that one cannot take for granted that “smoothness of price movements
is the sign of an eﬃcient market” (p. 125). A detailed description of the performance criteria
used follows hereafter.
The ﬁrst basic criterion of allocative eﬃciency is whether a protocol converges to the eﬃ-
cient allocation in ﬁnite time. Convergence to the eﬃcient allocation is generically achieved,
at a price equal to the competitive equilibrium price p∗. Clearly, in any of the four proto-
cols the current price may hit p∗ before the eﬃcient allocation is attained. Therefore, we
evaluate the speed of convergence by recording the number of trading sessions completed
before no further trading takes place. For short, we call this number NT as a mnemonic for
“no trade”. To evaluate the dynamic properties of the protocols, we also keep track over
time of the distance of the current allocation from the eﬃcient one.
Volume is measured by the total number of one-unit transactions completed before at-
taining convergence to the eﬃcient allocation. We also monitor volume over time, measured
by the cumulative number of transactions completed within the ﬁrst t trading sessions. Un-
der the automated dealership protocol, the transfer of one unit from a trader to another
one must go through the dealer and therefore requires two transactions, instead of just one.
Whenever two matching transactions go through the dealer, we record them as one so that
the statistics for volume report for each protocol the eﬀective number of transactions com-
pleted between agents. This makes volume directly comparable across protocols, even if it
fails to record the few units of unmatched inventory that may remain with the specialist.
Another evaluation criterion is the subjective welfare of the traders, which we measure
1The source code for the exemplar is available at http://venus.unive.it/licalzi/research.html.
13by the certainty equivalent of their current position. The advantage of using certainty
equivalents over utilities is that we can compute (and compare) the monetary value of an
allocation by summing up the certainty equivalents of all traders. We note that protocols
such as the batch auction or the continuous double auction are self-contained, in the sense
that traders exchange cash and stock only among themselves. The overall value of an
eﬃcient allocation is of course always the same. However, when trading among agents goes
through a dealer, some money is lost because of the bid-ask spread. Therefore, we expect
the overall value of the allocation to be lower for protocols which are not self-contained.
Finally, we keep track of the standard deviations and the kurtosis of the time series of
closing prices. (The closing price is the last price at which a transaction has taken place by
the end of the current trading session.) For each simulation, we compute these two statistics
over the closing prices between the ﬁrst trading session and the last active trading session;
that is, from time t = 1 to NT. As usual, we report the standardized kurtosis κ; that is,
κ = µ4/µ2
2 − 3, where µi is the i-th central moment of the empirical distribution. It is
well-known that κ = 0 for a normal distribution. From a dynamic point of view, we report
the standard deviations over closing prices computed over a moving time window formed
by the last 20 trading sessions.
4 Results
For each of the four market protocols, we have run several simulations under the diﬀerent
three behavioral assumptions. As discussed below, replacing TT with GS implies only
minor changes that we compactly summarize in Section 4.2. To simplify the presentation,
we ﬁx the choice of parameters as described above in Table 1 and study the variations
principally across the four protocols for the TT and the MA behavioral assumptions. A
separate robustness analysis discusses the choice of diﬀerent parameters.
As discussed in Section 2.1, the eﬃcient allocation is unique and proportional to the
coeﬃcient of risk tolerance. Given our exemplar, this corresponds to each trader holding a
ﬁnal endowment of stock equal to twice his coeﬃcient of risk tolerance. A visual summary
of the eﬃcient allocation is in Figure 2. Assuming suﬃcient liquidity (as we do in this
paper), all simulations converge to this eﬃcient allocation in ﬁnite time. In particular, for
the exemplar discussed here, the implementation is exact and the price converges to the
competitive equilibrium price p∗ = 760.
From a static point of view, the obvious benchmark for the comparative evaluation of our
performance criteria is the Walrasian allocation mechanism known as tˆ atonnement. While































Figure 2: Final endowments versus risk tolerances.
its informational requirements are unwieldy and thus its practical interest is very limited, in
our context the tˆ atonnement protocol is guaranteed to yield the eﬃcient allocation in one
(giant) step. This protocol also attains the competitive equilibrium price p∗. Finally, and
perhaps more interestingly, it minimizes the number of transactions needed to achieve the
eﬃcient allocation because it correctly matches traders with positive excess demand with
agents with negative excess demand.
4.1 The TT assumption
Table 2 reports summary statistics computed as averages over 25 diﬀerent batches of simu-
lations under the TT behavioral assumption. We report the averages because they are more
robust to individual variations, but we also note that no signiﬁcant departures from these
statistics were observed in the individual simulations. Within each batch, we use the same
(randomized) choices over the four protocols, as explained in Section 3.2. The table reports
several pieces of information for each of the four protocols, as listed in the ﬁrst column. We
comment on each of them.
The second and third columns give the traded volume (Vol) and the percentage of excess
volume (ExcV) with respect to the number of transactions that the Walrasian protocol
would require to achieve in one step the eﬃcient allocation. The batch auction and the
specialist dealership generate minimal excess volume: which one performs better in this
15Prot. Vol ExcV NT CE Loss Dist SD Kurt
B 11322.44 2.7% 148.32 88079.50 0.00% 0.00 4.57 6.288
C 28778.04 161% 149.40 88079.50 0.00% 0.00 31.72 3.405
D 11157.48 1.6% 143.56 88022.26 0.065% 0.11 4.09 0.754
H 16221.56 47% 144.88 88050.15 0.033% 0.01 2.77 -0.020
Table 2: TT: summary statistics for 25 passes with n = 1000.
respect depends on how far are the initial dealer’s quotes from the equilibrium price. The
continuous double auction is seriously wasteful, while the hybrid protocol sits in between its
parents (dealership and continuous double auction). The ranking with respect to volume is
{B,D} > H > C, where > stands for “less volume” and the notation {B,D} means that
the ranking is not conclusive. (This applies when our extensive analysis has found reversals
in ranking across simulations, usually diﬀerent from the exemplar.) From a dynamic point
of view, Figure 3 conﬁrms this ranking. (B is barely visible because it is covered by D.)


























Figure 3: TT: volume versus time.
The fourth column in Table 2 computes the number (NT) of trading days necessary to
achieve no trade and hence the eﬃcient allocation. In our exemplar case, the maximum
number of units between the initial endowment and the ﬁnal eﬃcient endowment is 60,
so this is a lower bound on the number of trading sessions required to achieve allocative
16eﬃciency. The seventh colum reports the distance (Dist) of the ﬁnal allocation from the
eﬃcient allocation. (We measure the distance using the norm one normalized by the number
of traders: thus, d(e,e∗) =
P
i |ei − e∗
i|/n.) All protocols achieve the eﬃcient allocation,
sometimes up to one unit for one trader who cannot ﬁnd the counterpart for his last unit
trade. The ranking with respect to convergence is D > H > B > C, where > stands for
“smaller time to no trade”. The diﬀerences are very small, but persistent.
From a dynamic point of view, the ability of all protocols to achieve allocative eﬃciency
is shown in Figure 4, which reports the distance of the current allocation from the eﬃcient
one with respect to the cumulative volume. (B is barely visible because it is covered by D.)
This graph provides an implicit indicator of the ability of a protocol to minimize the number


































Figure 4: TT: distance from eﬃcient allocation versus volume.
of wasteful trades during its search for allocative eﬃciency. In this respect, the ranking is
{B,D} > H > C. Instead of volume, one may also plot the distance from the eﬃcient
allocation with respect to time. Since during a trading session all agents are randomly
sampled and attempt to make a transaction, this would gauge the ability of a protocol to
minimize the number of unnecessary attempted trades on the part of the traders. We do
not report the plot here to save space, but the ranking it shows is {B,D,H} > C. Even
though the continuous double auction generates higher trade within a session, under TT
this does not work towards reducing the number of unnecessary calls in later sessions.
The ﬁfth column in Table 2 reports the arithmetic average of traders’ certainty equiv-
17alents at time NT, while the sixth column gives the percentage loss with respect to the
sum of certainty equivalents associated with the Walrasian allocation. This statistics is of
course zero for the batch auction and the continuous double auction, because within these
protocols all exchanges take place among traders who never accept disadvantageous trades.
It is relevant to evaluate the loss of welfare imposed by the presence of a specialist dealer.
Because of the bid-ask spread, when a trader with negative excess demand of one unit com-
pletes a transaction with a trader with positive excess demand of one unit by going through
the dealer, they end up jointly losing some money to the dealer. The ranking in this respect
is {B,C} > H > D, where > stands for “lower monetary losses”. It is conﬁrmed from a
dynamic point of view in Figure 5.













































Figure 5: TT: sum of traders’ certainty equivalents over time.
Finally, the eight and ninth columns in Table 2 reports the variance and the kurtosis
of the time series of the closing prices from the ﬁrst trading day until NT. The ranking
with respect to overall volatility of prices is H > {B,D} > C, where > stands for “lower
volatility”. Note also that both the dealership and the hybrid protocol generate empirical
distributions for prices that more closely approximate the normal distribution. In a diﬀerent
context, LiCalzi and Pellizzari (2003) has already noted the propensity of the continuous
double auction to generate non-normal statistics even under zero intelligence trading. From
a dynamic point of view, Figure 6 reports the standard deviations of the closing prices
computed over time windows of 20 trading days. The volatility of the continuous double
































Figure 6: TT: volatillity of prices versus time. (Moving window: 20 trading days.)
auction is initially very high, but then settles down to levels similar to the hybrid protocol.
The volatility of the batch auction increases when approaching the no trade time. This
is a well-known consequence of the instability of the k-double auction protocol when the
excess demand function has huge ﬂats around the exchange price. We have ﬁxed k = 1/2
by assumption, but the instability could be greatly reduced without aﬀecting allocative
eﬃciency by manipulating the value of k. Based on the dynamic comparison, the static
ranking of protocols with respect to volatility should be taken with a grain of salt.
4.2 The GS assumption
Compared to TT, GS favors more eﬃcacy over less immediacy because agents declare more
extreme prices that are harder to cross. Table 3 reports summary statistics computed as
averages over 25 diﬀerent batches of simulations under the GS behavioral assumption. The
same features described at the beginning of Section 4.1 hold.
Under GS, the rankings deduced from the table or from the dynamic comparisons (not
shown here) are always the same as in TT. There is only one seeming exception from the
fourth column of the table. This suggests that the ranking with respect to convergence
is H > D > C > B, where > stands for “smaller time to no trade”, rather than D >
H > B > C as in TT. However, this diﬀerence in rankings is partly an artifact due to a
19Prot. Vol ExcV NT mCE Loss Dist SD Kurt
B 11159.92 1.2% 605.28 88079.50 0.00% 0.00 1.94 42.188
C 24855.60 125% 512.96 88079.50 0.00% 0.00 16.42 22.328
D 10878.84 -0.23% 408.04 88023.01 0.064% 0.27 3.85 5.636
H 14147.56 28% 172.00 88045.47 0.039% 0.01 2.78 0.054
Table 3: GS: summary statistics for 25 passes with n = 1000.
few outliers. Under GS, once a protocol has reached an allocation suﬃciently close to the
eﬃcient one, it has to wait until one of the few “ineﬃcient” traders draws the right price in
order to complete a transaction. In the meanwhile, several sessions go away with no trades
at all. Therefore, on average full convergence under GS takes longer to be achieved. The
statistics reported in the fourth column is the average number of trading sessions to achieve
no trade and then is aﬀected by these long waiting times.
A more stable indicator in this respect is the median number of trading sessions to no
trade, which gives: B(580),C(494),D(146),H(166). This provides two pieces of informa-
tion. First, the only reversal in ranking with respect to TT concerns B and C. Second,
the number of sessions needed to achieve almost full convergence under GS is comparable
to what is needed for full convergence in the presence of a specialist dealer, but it is deﬁ-
nitely larger for B and C. Intuitively, the higher eﬃcacy sought by traders under GS slows
down the attainment of eﬃciency only in the absence of the price-stabilizing inﬂuence of
the specialist.
4.3 The MA assumption
Compared to TT, MA favors more immediacy over less eﬃcacy because it implies that
agents have less demanding requirements for agreeing to a transaction. Under TT (or GS),
whenever two agents agree to a trade, their transaction must improve their joint welfare
with respect to their positions immediately before trading. Under MA, it suﬃces that their
joint welfare is improved with respect to their initial positions, but not necessarily with
respect to their positions immediately before trading. We say that the trading under TT
(or GS) is incrementally improving, while trading under MA is overall improving. This
diﬀerence in the quality of the improvement sought for agreeing to a transaction probably
accounts for most diﬀerences between TT (or GS) and MA.
Table 4 reports summary statistics computed as averages over 25 diﬀerent batches of
simulations under the MA behavioral assumption. The same features described at the
20beginning of Section 4.1 hold.
Prot. Vol ExcV NT mCE Loss Dist SD Kurt
B 173995.40 1478% 1361.40 88079.50 0.00% 0.00 10.92 3.473
C 248730.72 2156% 785.84 88079.47 0.00% 0.018 75.12 13.150
D 106327.36 864% 925.76 87539.94 0.61% 0.016 9.64 -0.665
H 148756.60 1248% 1081.60 87757.00 0.41% 0.01 8.76 -0.771
Table 4: MA: summary statistics for 25 passes with n = 1000.
Even if the MA behavioral assumption is clearly less eﬀective towards this purpose, all
protocols achieve allocative eﬃciency. This conﬁrms their ability to act as partial substi-
tutes for individual rationality. Compared to TT it now takes longer to reach the eﬃcient
allocation and the traded volumes are uniformly much higher. Traders have less demanding
requirements to accept a trade and therefore much more wasteful trading goes on. The
ranking with respect to volume is D > H > B > C, where > stands for “less volume”.
Compared to TT, the only change in the ranking is the decline of B to third place. From
a dynamic point of view, Figure 7 conﬁrms the ranking and adds the information that the
continuous double auction undergoes a sharp transition in performance. For a long initial




























Figure 7: MA: volume versus time.
stretch of time, it generates the highest volumes. As it approaches convergence to the ef-
21ﬁcient allocation, the volume drops signiﬁcantly to a minimum level, comparable only to
what the dealership generates.
The ranking with respect to convergence is C > D > H > B, where > stands for
“smaller time to no trade”. Compared to TT, the only change in the ranking is the im-
provement of C from last to ﬁrst place. The dynamic analysis reveals that this increase
in rank is somewhat misleading. Figure 8 shows the distance from the eﬃcient allocation
as a function of the number of trading sessions. The sharp transition in performance ob-






































Figure 8: MA: distance from eﬃcient allocation versus time.
served before for the continuous double auction is still there. This protocol stays farther
away from the eﬃcient allocation than the other protocols for most time, until it drops
down quite abruptly (and faster) to the eﬃcient allocation. A clearer picture emerges from
Figure 9, which plots the distance against the cumulative volume and provides the ranking
D > H > B > C for the ability of protocols to avoid wasteful trades. Compared to TT,
where the batch auction and the dealership performed similarly, the MA assumption brings
out a comparative greater ability of the dealership to guide traders to the eﬃcient allocation
faster.
The ranking with respect to the loss in welfare is the same as under TT. Consistent with
the increase in traded volume, the loss of welfare imposed by the presence of a specialist
dealer is now higher than under TT. Remarkably, this loss stays quite small. Figure 10
conﬁrms the obvious ranking from a dynamic point of view.


































Figure 9: MA: distance from eﬃcient allocation versus volume.













































Figure 10: MA: sum of traders’ certainty equivalents versus time.
23The ranking with respect to overall volatility of prices is H > D > B > C, where >
stands for “lower volatility”. Compared to TT, the ranking is unchanged but now unam-
biguously puts the batch auction behind dealership. This suggests that the nondiscretionary
rule imposed on the specialist is quite eﬀective in dampening oscillations in price, even in
the mixed contexts exempliﬁed by our hybrid protocol. From a dynamic point of view, after
rescaling time, Figure 11 shows no substantial diﬀerences from the analogous plot under
TT.
































Figure 11: MA: volatillity of prices over time. (Moving window: 20 trading days.)
4.4 Tests of robustness
We have tested the robustness of our model under several diﬀerent instantiations of its
parameters. The only variable with a signiﬁcant impact on the results is the overall liquidity
of the system. When there is no suﬃcient cash in the system, some transactions that would
enhance the allocative eﬃciency violate budget constraints and cannot be carried out. All
the simulations reported in this paper are not aﬀected by issues originating from insuﬃcient
liquidity.
In order to provide the reader with a more speciﬁc appreciation of this robustness, let
us turn to the exemplar parametric conﬁguration given in Table 1. We have run separate
checks on each parameter, while keeping the others ﬁxed. For each of these checks, we have
24obtained summary statistics (computed as averages over 25 diﬀerent batches of simulations)
and compared the rankings associated with them. Within a large range of values for each
parameter, the rankings stay almost always unchanged. For instance, initializing n = 250
instead of n = 1000 produces only one change in the rankings: under TT, the kurtosis for
B is now lower than for C. Similarly, no appreciable changes in the rankings emerge if we
initialize traders’ individual parameters so that exact implementation does not hold.
A particularly interesting test of robustness was run on the initial dealer’s quotes. As
described in Section 3.1, the exemplar conﬁguration assumes an initial bid of 746 and an
inital ask of 751. This bid-ask interval is not far from the competitive equilibrium price of
760, raising the legitimate suspicion that this might favorably bias the performance of the
specialist-based protocols. Therefore, we ran two batches of 25 simulations each assuming
a large variation of up to ±33% in the initial dealers’ quotes; more precisely, we assumed
an initial bid-ask interval of [495,501] and [895,901], respectively. We observed no changes
in the ﬁnal rankings. Clearly, when the initial interval is [495,501], the initial ask quote
vastly underestimates the equilibrium price. Therefore, the dealer is initially obliged to go
short on stock and match the strong incoming excess demand at prices unfavorable to her.
Nonetheless, her quotes recover suﬃciently fast that, when the no trade time is reached,
the monetary value of her position is invariably increased; in other words, the dealer’s
subsequent proﬁts from trading with a bid-ask spread suﬃce to make up for her initial
losses. A symmetric conclusion holds when the initial quotes overestimate the equilibrium
price.
5 Conclusions
The experimental literature has collected an ample empirical evidence about trading by
human agents in the continuous double auction. As summarized in Smith (1982), the
evidence shows that allocations and prices converge rapidly to the competitive equilibrium
predictions, even if the informational requirements of this protocol are very simple. Gode
and Sunder (1993) argues that the robustness of this conclusion is due to an intrinsic
ability of the protocol to guide traders towards the eﬃcient allocation. Our study conﬁrms
the allocative eﬃciency of the continuous double auction under two additional behavioral
assumptions and, more importantly, extends Gode and Sunder’s claim to other simple
protocols.
Our (computerized) experiments shows that there are several simple protocols whose
ability to achieve allocational eﬃciency seems comparable and pretty robust. Therefore,
25their performance should also be assessed over other relevant dimensions. Under our be-
havioral assumptions, a direct comparison with the batch auction shows that the continuous
double action is an inferior protocol with respect to volume, time to convergence, speed to
convergence, and volatility of prices. (The only exception is time to convergence under
the MA assumption.) This strongly suggests that the experimental literature should give
more attention to a comparative study of simultaneous versus sequential protocols; see
Section 4.3.1.1 in Madhavan (2000) for a related argument.
We extended the comparison to two alternative simple protocols. The ﬁrst one is a
nondiscretionary form of specialist dealership, in which the rule by which quotes reacts
to transactions is entirely automated and the specialist must adjust prices by one in the
direction of the last trade completed. The specialist protocol is equivalent to introducing an
additional agent in the market, who in a sense brings more rationality to traders’ groping
for the eﬃcient allocation. However, note that the specialist is not required to exhibit zero
intelligence and must accept all trades that she is proposed. It turns out that following
the nondiscretionary rule suﬃces to produce (modest) gains while keeping her inventory
under control. Intuitively, although she may occasionally lose money on some trade, our
implementation of the specialist dealership improves her wealth on average. Glosten and
Milgrom (1985) prove formally that this holds for a more sophisticated version of specialist
dealership in an environment with diversely informed traders.
Under our behavioral assumptions, this specialist protocol has a lower time to conver-
gence and never performs worse than the batch auction. Its only drawback is that the
specialist protocol drains a tiny amount of wealth from the traders, which could on the
other hand be reallocated to traders at the end of process making the specialist “neutral”.
This makes the specialist dealership a natural candidate for investigation in the search for
eﬀective protocols to achieve allocational eﬃciency.
We ﬁnally tested a hybrid protocol, that sides the specialist dealer with the continu-
ous double auction giving each trader the option to transact at the most favorable quote
available. Under our behavioral assumptions, the hybrid protocol reduces the volatility of
prices and the gains of the specialist, but is otherwise inferior to the specialist protocol.
The reduction in volatility and in the dealer’s gains are easily explained. The specialist
starts with initial quotes that may be away from the equilibrium price and must keep a
ﬁxed bid-ask spread. Almost all trades initially go through her until her quotes adjust to
a level compatible with the equilibrium price. From then on, competition from the traders
may occasionally provide better quotes than the dealer’s bid-ask spread permits, thereby
reducing volatility and her gains.
26To conclude, we ﬁnd that under our behavioral assumptions the four protocols generi-
cally converge to the eﬃcient allocation in ﬁnite time. An extended comparison over other
performance criteria reveals that the all-round ranking should put the specialist dealership
in ﬁrst place and the continuous double auction in fourth place. The exact ranking for
the batch auction and the hybrid protocol depends on the weights given to the other per-
formance criteria, although we personally judge the batch auction superior to the hybrid
protocol. Finally, we remark that these conclusions hold assuming no informational eﬀects
and no strategic behavior on the part of traders.
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